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ARTICLES

JUDULANG V. HOLDER AND THE FUTURE OF
212(c) RELIEF
PATRICK GLEN*
INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in
Judulang v. Holder, the latest chapter in the strange afterlife of former section
212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.1 Section 212(c), initially
enacted in 1952, granted the Attorney General discretion to waive the
inadmissibility of certain qualifying lawful permanent residents.2 Repealed
in 1996 as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,3 it was given a second-life by the Supreme Court in its 2001
decision in INS v. St. Cyr.4 In that decision, the Court held that 212(c) relief
remains available to qualifying residents notwithstanding its repeal, in
circumstances where the alien pled guilty to an offense prior to the repeal and
would have been eligible for 212(c) relief at the time of his or her plea.5 The
decision in Judulang addressed a discrete question regarding the eligibility of
aliens charged with deportability to seek a waiver under former section
212(c), a form of relief ostensibly limited to aliens charged with inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals had extended relief under section
212(c) to aliens charged with deportability, but only if the ground of
deportation was comparable to a ground of inadmissibility. In Judulang, the
Supreme Court held that the Board’s use of this “comparable grounds”
analysis was “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure

* © 2013, Patrick Glen.
1. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
2. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996).
3. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
4. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
5. Id. at 326.
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Act.6 It thus remanded proceedings in order for the agency to create a new
mechanism by which to determine the eligibility of deportable aliens for
relief under former section 212(c).7
Commentators were quick to latch onto the “arbitrary and capricious”
language of the Court’s opinion and hail it as a signal that the judiciary would
be especially vigilant in ensuring that the immigration system would meet the
appropriate standards of due process and justice. The New York Times ran an
editorial opining that Judulang highlights the “irrationality in deportation
law.” “A stinging opinion by Justice Elena Kagan for a unanimous Supreme
Court reinforced last month a message that lower courts have been sending
for many years; the law applied in immigration cases too often fails to meet
the standards of justice.”8 The National Law Journal also ran an opinion
piece, describing Judulang as an indication that the Supreme Court was
willing to pay attention to arbitrary, irrational, or inconsistent agency
decision-making affecting the ability of resident aliens to remain in the
United States.9 On SCOTUSBlog, Dean Kevin Johnson of U.C. Davis law
school also highlighted Judulang as a signal to the executive branch and its
immigration authorities: “The U.S. government, and specifically the Board of
Immigration Appeals, should pay heed to the growing number of cases in
recent years in which the Supreme Court has rejected its positions in removal
cases.”10
The unanimity of commentator opinion should not obscure its simplistic
assessment of the case and its failure to address the history in which Judulang
must be situated. A fair assessment of Judulang would begin with the statute
itself, and the Supreme Court’s consistent reference in Judulang to the fact
that the text of 212(c) does not, and thus could never have, supported the
extension of 212(c) relief into the deportation context. The problem that the
Supreme Court was called on to resolve was thus a function of the Board’s
decision to extend discretionary relief to a class of aliens that should never
have been deemed to fall within the purview of 212(c). Whether the Board’s
practice of determining which deportable aliens should be deemed eligible
for 212(c) relief was correctly found to be arbitrary should not obscure this
underlying fact—that the allegations of arbitrariness arose not out of a
restrictive or narrow interpretation of the INA, but from an expansive
interpretation that has, since 1952, granted relief to tens of thousands of
aliens who, absent the Board’s extension of the statute, would have been
deported. The narrative painted by the New York Times and Dean Johnson,
among others, simply does not fit the history of 212(c), however well it might

6. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479.
7. Id. at 490.
8. Editorial, Irrationality in Deportation Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2012, at A24.
9. Brett A. Shumate, A demand of consistent deportation decisions, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 2, 2012.
10. Kevin Johnson, Opinion analysis: Judulang v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 13, 2011, 10:40
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/12/opinion-analysis-judulang-v-holder/.
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fit with false and biased conceptions of the Board as an institution antithetical
to the interests of aliens.
Leaving these points aside, the purpose of the instant article is to place
Judulang within the historical context of the relevant immigration laws,
while also determining what ways forward are open to the Board in its newly
charged mission to find a replacement for the comparable grounds analysis.
Section I reviews the context of the 212(c) conundrum, the differentiation
between aliens who are inadmissible to the United States and those who are
deportable. This distinction is at the heart of and serves to frame the historical
evolution of relief under former section 212(c). Section II turns to that
evolving history, tracing 212(c) through four major epochs, beginning with
its antecedent, the Seventh Proviso, the enactment of 212(c) in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the Second Circuit’s decision in Francis v.
INS, and culminating in the repeal of 212(c) and the steps taken by the Board
in the wake of 212(c)’s resuscitation in St. Cyr. Section III highlights the
conflict in the courts of appeals regarding the proper method for determining
the eligibility of deportable aliens for relief under section 212(c), which leads
into Section IV’s deconstruction and analysis of the decision in Judulang.
Finally, Section V attempts to ascertain how the Board should approach a
deportable alien’s eligibility for 212(c) relief post-Judulang. Unfortunately,
this final section cannot rely too much on the decision itself, as Judulang
dodged the most important issues relating to the continuing eligibility of
deportable aliens for relief under section 212(c), while falling into hopelessly
intractable internal contradictions regarding the appropriate path forward.
Whatever values may inhere in unanimity, Justice Kagan’s opinion fails as a
guidepost for agency action.
The history of 212(c) makes clear that the vast morass 212(c) relief has
become since 1952 is due not to the agency’s too-quick desire to remove
resident aliens from the United States using any means possible, but from its
attempts to extend relief to classes of aliens not covered by the text of the
statute itself. If the proverbial road to Hell is in fact paved with good
intentions, the road to Judulang is similarly paved with the attempts of the
Board and successive Attorneys General to safe-guard the ability of resident
aliens to remain in the United States. This does not mean that the end result
has not been a policy that is arbitrary or capricious, only that the agency
should be given more credit for attempting to inject a humanitarian impulse
into the text of the statute.

I.

INADMISSIBILITY, DEPORTABILITY, AND REMOVABILITY

Non-citizens of the United States do not constitute a single, homogenous
group that receives identical treatment or benefits under this country’s
immigration laws. Rather, the immigration laws of the United States have
“historically distinguished between aliens who have ‘entered’ the United
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States and aliens still seeking to enter (whether or not they are physically on
American soil).”11 Immigration proceedings, as historically understood, thus
comprised two distinct sets of proceedings depending on the position of the
alien—exclusion or inadmissibility proceedings and deportation proceedings. As the Supreme Court explained in 1982, “[t]he deportation proceeding
is the usual means of proceeding against an alien already physically present
in the United States, and the exclusion hearing is the usual means of
proceeding against an alien outside the United States seeking admission.”12
These distinct proceedings differed in several important ways, from the
mechanism of judicial review permitted following the conclusion of administrative proceedings, to the due process protections attendant upon the specific
proceeding itself and the forms of relief an alien might be eligible to seek.13
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act.14 This wide-ranging act eliminated the distinction between “exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings, and replaced them with a
single unified proceeding termed a “removal proceeding.”15 Despite the
elimination of these discrete forms of proceedings, the INA retained the
distinction between being inadmissible and being deportable by retaining the
separate statutory provisions providing for grounds of inadmissibility and
deportability.16 There is significant overlap between these two statutory
provisions. For instance, the conviction or commission of a crime involving
moral turpitude can subject an alien to both inadmissibility and deportability.17 Aliens are both inadmissible and deportable on identical securityrelated grounds, for engaging in terrorist activities, for participating in
Nazi-related persecution and genocide, and for committing severe violations
of religious freedom.18 Alien-smuggling is both a ground of inadmissibility
and deportability,19 as is making a false-claim of United States citizenship.20
Yet there are also important differences between the two classes of
11. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 349 (2005) (citing Leng May
Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (“It is important to note at the outset that our immigration
laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking
admission . . . and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.”)).
12. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982); see Patrick J. Glen, The Removability of
Non-Citizen Parents and the Best Interests of Citizen Children: How to Balance Competing
Imperatives in the Context of Removal Proceedings, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 12-13 (2012).
13. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 25-27.
14. See supra note 3.
15. IIRIRA § 304(a)(3); see INA §§ 239, 240, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229, 1229a (2006); see also Jama,
543 U.S. at 349.
16. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006) (grounds of inadmissibility); INA § 237(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006) (grounds of deportability).
17. Compare INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) (2006), with INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
18. Compare INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2006), with INA § 237(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(4) (2006).
19. Compare INA § 212(a)(6)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (2006), with INA § 237(a)(1)(E),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E) (2006).
20. Compare INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (2006), with INA § 237(a)(3)(D),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D) (2006).
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“removable” aliens. Some of these distinctions are related to systemic
differences stemming from the fact that inadmissibility targets those who are
generally not yet in the United States, whereas deportability targets those
who are present in the United States. Thus, aliens who have been previously
ordered removed or have accrued a period of unlawful presence in the United
States are inadmissible, and aliens may be charged with inadmissibility on
health-related grounds, i.e., that they have an infectious or dangerous
disease.21 To the contrary, an alien may become deportable on account of the
expiration or termination of his period of lawful residence in the United
States,22 or be deportable because, at the time of his entry, he was inadmissible to the United States.23
The most important difference in these grounds of removal for 212(c)
relief is the inclusion of a ground of deportability for aliens convicted of an
aggravated felony and the lack of such a specific ground in the context of
inadmissibility.24 Although discrete classes of “aggravated felons,” as defined by the INA, might come within the purview of a specific ground of
inadmissibility, there is no general aggravated felony ground of inadmissibility.25
A final point of distinction between inadmissibility and deportability,
which will be clarified and expanded upon in the following section relating to
the history of 212(c), relates to relief from removal. When a waiver of a
ground of removability is provided in the INA, it is tied specifically to the
lodged charge of removal. Thus, whether an alien is inadmissible or deportable will affect what waivers of removal he might be eligible to pursue. For
example, section 212(h) of the INA provides a waiver of inadmissibility to
aliens charged with being inadmissible on certain criminal grounds, but not
to aliens who are deportable on account of criminal convictions.26 Likewise,
despite identical grounds of inadmissibility and deportability related to
alien-smuggling, the INA provides distinct waivers depending on whether

21. See INA § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (2006) (inadmissibility on account of prior order
of removal or the accrual of unlawful presence in the United States); INA § 212(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(1) (2006) (certain aliens may be inadmissible on account of health-related grounds).
22. See INA § 237(a)(1)(C)-(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)-(D) (2006).
23. See INA § 237(a)(1)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2006); but see INA
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006) (an alien present in the United States without
having been admitted or paroled is inadmissible, a point especially important in the context of
adjustment of status where an alien will have to establish his admissibility).
24. Compare INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006), with INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
25. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011) (citing Matter of Meza, 20 I. & N. Dec. 257
(B.I.A. 1991)). Compare INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006) (meaning of
aggravated felony encompasses illicit trafficking in a controlled substance), with INA § 212(a)(2)(C),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) (2006) (“controlled substance traffickers” are inadmissible).
26. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006); see Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 890-94 (5th Cir.
2011); Klementanovsky v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 788, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2007).

6

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1

the alien is inadmissible or deportable.27 In short, pursuant to the general
distinction between inadmissibility and deportability, the placement of section 212(c) in the statute pertaining to inadmissibility should give rise to a
presumption that any relief available under that provision is limited to aliens
charged with inadmissibility. The history of 212(c) is, of course, contrary to
that assumption.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF 212(C)

To fully understand Judulang, one must first understand the history of
former section 212(c). This history spans nearly one hundred years, and can
be broadly divided into four major epochs encompassing specific agency
practices: 1) the Seventh Proviso of the Immigration Act of 1917; 2) the
initial enactment of section 212(c) in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952; 3) the Second Circuit’s decision in Francis v. INS and its aftermath;
and 4) post-repeal/post-St. Cyr. This is not a comprehensive history of all the
various intricacies of agency application of 212(c), but seeks only to explain
how the interpretation of 212(c) reached the form the Supreme Court found
so objectionable in Judulang.
A. The Seventh Proviso of the Immigration Act of 1917
The genesis of what would become section 212(c) relief can be traced to
the Seventh Proviso of the Immigration Act of 1917.28 Section 3 of that Act
listed those classes of aliens who “shall be excluded from admission into the
United States.”29 Notwithstanding the general exclusion grounds, the socalled Seventh Proviso granted the Secretary of Labor the discretion to admit
certain otherwise excludable aliens in set circumstances: “[A]liens returning
after a temporary absence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of
seven consecutive years may be admitted in the discretion of the Secretary of
Labor, and under such conditions as he may prescribe.”30
The Senate justified the enactment of the Seventh Proviso in its report on
the bill that would become the 1917 Act: “it seems only just and humane to
invest the Secretary of Labor with authority to permit the readmission to the
United States of aliens who have lived here for a long time and whose
exclusion after a temporary absence would result in peculiar or unusual
hardship.”31 Yet the immediate impetus behind the Seventh Proviso was not
an abstract desire to grant the Secretary of Labor a blank check for the
27. Compare INA § 212(d)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11) (2006) (providing a waiver of inadmissibility), with INA § 237(a)(1)(E)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(iii) (2006) (providing a waiver of
deportability).
28. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
29. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29 § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875.
30. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 878, 8 U.S.C. § 136(p) (1925) (repealed
1952).
31. S. Rep. No. 63-355, at 6 (1914).
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exercise of discretion. Rather, “Congress intended the Seventh Proviso as a
hardship measure for aliens who were temporarily out of the country when
the Immigration Act of 1917 was passed and who, for reasons often technical
in nature, were excludable upon their return.”32 Whatever limitations Congress may have had in mind in enacting the Seventh Proviso, Secretary of
Labor Frances Perkins declined to apply the provision in a narrow fashion
during her helm at the Department of Labor. Secretary Perkins used the
“concept ‘returning after a temporary absence’ to apply to aliens who had not
yet departed and to include in its scope illegal aliens who ‘have lived here a
long time.’”33 Through this application, the Seventh Proviso was extended
from the exclusion context to at least some sympathetic deportation cases.
In 1940, in the midst of a European war that had not yet directly involved
the United States in hostilities, President Roosevelt transmitted his Reorganization Plan No. V to the Congress, which transferred the Immigration and
Naturalization Service from the Department of Labor to the Department of
Justice.34 This shift was justified by the President based on the exigencies of
the moment:
[T]he startling sequence of international events which has occurred
since [the submission of Reorganization Plan No. IV] has necessitated a
review of the measures required for the Nation’s safety. This has
revealed a pressing need for the transfer of the immigration and
naturalization functions from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice . . . . I am convinced . . . that under existing conditions
the immigration and naturalization activities can best contribute to the
national well-being only if they are closely integrated with the activities
of the Department of Justice.35
With this transfer of authority to the Justice Department, the discretionary
authority contained in the Seventh Proviso passed from the Secretary of
Labor to the Attorney General.36
Under the authority of the Attorney General, the Seventh Proviso was
confined to its terms, i.e., to aliens charged with excludability, except for
certain distinct circumstances where it was extended to aliens charged with
deportability. Relief under the Seventh Proviso was permitted nunc pro tunc,
in circumstances where the alien’s offense was committed prior to his last
entry and would have rendered him excludable if he had been stopped at the

32. Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and
Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 100 (2003).
33. Id.
34. Reorganization Plan No. V of 1940, ch. 231, § 1, 54 Stat. 230.
35. Message of the President Regarding Reorganization Plan No. V, May 22, 1940, available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title5/html/USCODE-2010-title5-app-reorganiz-otherdup4.htm.
36. See Reorganization Plan No. V of 1940, § 1; 54 Stat. at 231.
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border, but he was readmitted and only subsequently charged with being
subject to grounds of deportation.37 To hold otherwise, then Attorney General
Robert Jackson argued, would be irrational and would place the form of the
proceedings and other technical considerations above reason.38 The alien in
Matter of L “first became deportable at the time of his last entry, and the only
ground for deportation is one that might have been removed by discretionary
action at that time. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the
Attorney General may exercise a similar discretion in subsequent deportation
proceedings” as “[s]uch action, nunc pro tunc, amounts to little more than a
correction of a record of entry.”39
Although the operative factor in Matter of L seemed to be that the alien’s
conviction pre-dated his last departure, entry, and the subsequent institution
of deportation proceedings, in Matter of A the Board extended operation of
the Seventh Proviso to a case where the alien was convicted of the relevant
crime after his last entry.40 The Board likened this extension of the Seventh
Proviso to the discretionary authority it exercised in the context of preexamination, whereby aliens unlawfully present in the U.S. could be “preexamined” for admission, depart the country, and then “reenter the United
States formally as a legal admission.”41 Utilizing this discretionary authority
in deportation proceedings enabled the alien “to depart and, with the ground
of exclusion removed in advance, to reenter legally,” but did not excuse the
deportation ground itself, i.e., the alien had to actually depart.42 Thus, the
Board concluded “that advance exercise of Seventh Proviso power is
available to an alien deportable for a crime committed within 5 years of entry
as well as to one deportable for a crime prior to entry.”43
Accordingly, by the eve of passage of the Immigration Act of 1952, the
Seventh Proviso had, in application by both the Labor and Justice Departments, far outstripped the limited purposes for which Congress had initially
enacted the provision.
B. The Codification of 212(c) in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952
In the debates running up to the enactment of the 1952 Act, the Seventh
Proviso was specifically targeted for an overhaul; if it did manage to live into
the Immigration and Nationality Act, it would be on terms narrower and

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Matter of L, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A., A.G. 1940).
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Matter of A, 2 I. & N. Dec. 459 (B.I.A. 1946; A.G. 1947).
Ngai, supra note 32, at 100-101.
Matter of A, 2 I. & N. Dec. at 460.
Id. at 462-63.
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stricter than what had prevailed since its 1917 codification.44 The Senate
Committee Report noted that a high percentage of those seeking relief under
the Seventh Proviso were granted relief, and that the percentage of those
granted relief had risen in the years between 1947 and consideration of the
reforms that would become the 1952 Act.45 More problematic to Congress
was the drift in application away from the literal terms of the Proviso.
According to the report, “the proviso was intended to give discretionary
power to the proper Government official to grant relief to aliens who were
reentering the United States after temporary absence, who came in the front
door, were inspected, lawfully admitted, established homes here, and remained for 7 years before they got into trouble.”46 Yet the Proviso had been
applied regardless of the legality of entry, in cases where time after deportation was counted towards satisfying the 7 year domicile requirement, and in
deportation cases.47 Calls to outright abolish the Seventh Proviso were noted,
as were the perverse effects that application of the Proviso could lead to by
permitting otherwise inadmissible aliens to obtain residency simply by
initially evading the immigrations laws and, after accruing sufficient presence in the U.S., applying via the Proviso or pre-examination for lawful
residency based on the length of their illegal presence in the United States.48
Rather than abolish this form of relief, however, the subcommittee considering the Act made the following recommendation: “that the proviso should be
limited to aliens who have the status of lawful permanent residents who are
returning to a lawful domicile of seven consecutive years after a temporary
absence abroad. They must have proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under
an order of deportation to be eligible for the relief. Furthermore . . . that the
provision should not be applicable in the case of aliens who are excludable
under the law as subversives.”49
Thus was born section 212(c). As enacted, section 212(c) provided that
“[a]liens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are
returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years,
may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General” notwithstanding
their ostensible inadmissibility under section 212(a) of the INA.50 The
language of 212(c), as enacted, tracked closely the Senate recommendations
and moved away from the Seventh Proviso in two important regards—relief
would only be available to lawful permanent residents, and the time spent
abroad could not be pursuant to an order of deportation.
44. See Mark J. DiFiore, Note, The Unforeseen Costs of Going to Trial: The Vitality of 212(c)
Relief for Lawful Permanent Residents Convicted by Trial, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 660-61 (2010).
45. See Sen. Rept. No. 81-1515, at 381-82 (1950).
46. Id. at 382.
47. Id. at 382-83.
48. Id. at 383.
49. Id. at 384.
50. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996).
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Initially, the Board seemed inclined to confine itself to the narrow
language of the statute. In Matter of T, the Board distinguished the new
provision from its predecessor, noting that the “discretionary relief embodied
in § 212(c) is no longer a discretion which may be used generally but is
confined to the grounds of inadmissibility enumerated therein.”51 The logic
of this early decision seemed to indicate that 212(c) was not applicable in
deportation proceedings, as the lodged charge in those proceedings necessarily would not fall within the ambit of those grounds the statute explicitly
made waivable by operation of 212(c).52 This limiting interpretation, if it was
in fact that, was short-lived. Regardless of 212(c)’s clear shift away from the
more open-ended grant of discretion under the Seventh Proviso, as well as
the Senate’s clear disapproval of the drift in administrative adjudication
under the prior regime, the Board again extended its interpretation of who
was eligible for discretionary relief beyond the clear text of the statute.
In 1954, the Board opined that there was no necessary bar to the
application of 212(c) in deportation proceedings, so long as that application
was of the same approximate form and manner as the prior application of the
Seventh Proviso.53 In a 1956 decision, the Board sanctioned the exercise of
212(c) discretion nunc pro tunc in the case of an alien who would have been
inadmissible at his last entry, but was admitted and only subsequently placed
into deportation proceedings.54 In so holding, the Board relied heavily upon
Attorney General Jackson’s decision in Matter of L, interpreting the proper
scope of relief under the Seventh Proviso.55 In Matter of Smith, the Board
permitted an alien to pursue a 212(c) waiver in deportation proceedings,
notwithstanding the fact that he had not departed and was thus not returning
to the United States, because he was applying for adjustment of status: “An
applicant for adjustment of status . . . stands in the same position as an
applicant who seeks to enter the United States with an immigration visa for
permanent residence . . . . Since this respondent . . . is subject to all of the
exclusion provisions of section 212(a) [in conjunction with his application
for adjustment of status], we find no valid reason for denying him the benefits
of section 212(c) on the technical ground that he is not returning to the United
States after a voluntary departure.”56
Despite these extensions, however, the Board did generally require that,
for a deportable alien to be eligible for 212(c) relief, there must be a departure
and reentry between the conviction or commission of the offense and the
institution of the deportation proceedings, even if the departure was only

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Matter of T, 5 I. & N. Dec. 389, 390 (B.I.A. 1953).
Id. at 390-91.
See Matter of S, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (B.I.A. 1954).
See Matter of G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (B.I.A. 1956).
Id. at 276.
Matter of Smith, 11 I. & N. Dec. 325, 326-27 (B.I.A. 1965).
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brief.57 In Matter of Arias-Uribe, the Board explicitly held that a deportable
alien, other than one seeking adjustment of status, could only apply for
212(c) relief if he was returning from abroad to resume residence in the
United States, i.e., only if the alien was convicted of the relevant offense
prior to their departure and reentry.58 In short, an alien who was convicted of
their deportable offense after their last entry and had not since departed could
not seek relief under section 212(c).59
C. Francis v. INS and BIA Acquiescence
From 1952 through 1976, the Board had, despite extending 212(c) relief
into the deportation context, required, consistent with the language of the
statute, a departure from the United States in order for a deportable alien to
establish eligibility for the waiver. In Francis v. INS, an alien challenged this
distinction as violating equal protection, and the Second Circuit agreed.60
Tracing the history of both the Seventh Proviso and 212(c), the Second
Circuit noted that at least one Seventh Proviso case, Matter of A, had not
required a departure from the United States in order to establish eligibility for
relief, and that Francis would be eligible for a 212(c) waiver under the
rationale of that decision.61
Regardless of how the Seventh Proviso had been interpreted, the Court did
note that under the new statutory regime of the INA, the Board had required
some departure between the offense or conviction and the institution of
deportation proceedings.62 Joining the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit held
that the Board’s interpretation of the statute as requiring this departure was
consistent with the actual text of 212(c).63 But the Court concluded that
regardless of the propriety of the Board’s statutory interpretation, the
distinction violated equal protection because there was no rational basis for
distinguishing between deportable aliens who had departed after their convictions and those who had not.64 To the Court, “[r]eason and fairness would
suggest that an alien whose ties with this country are so strong that he has
never departed after his initial entry should receive at least as much
consideration as an individual who may leave and return from time to
time.”65 Accordingly, despite its faithfulness to the statutory text, the Second
Circuit concluded that the Board’s limiting interpretation could not pass

57. See, e.g., Matter of Edwards, 10 I. & N. Dec. 506 (B.I.A. 1963, 1964).
58. Matter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (B.I.A. 1971).
59. Id. at 699-700.
60. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
61. Id. at 270. This is an incorrect reading of Matter of A, as that case did assume that the alien
would have to depart and reapply for admission. See Matter of A, 2 I. & N. Dec. at 461-63.
62. Id. at 271-72 (citing Matter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (B.I.A. 1971)).
63. Id. (citing Arias-Uribe v. INS, 499 F.2d 1198 (1972)).
64. Id. at 272-73.
65. Id. at 273.
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constitutional muster.66
The Solicitor General declined to seek certiorari in Francis, and the Board
and Immigration and Naturalization Service subsequently acquiesced in the
Court’s holding. In Matter of Silva, the BIA stated: “We conclude that . . . a
waiver of the ground of inadmissibility may be granted to a permanent
resident alien in deportation proceedings regardless of whether he departs the
United States following the act or acts which render him deportable. In light
of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the
law, it is our position that no distinction shall be made between permanent
resident aliens who temporarily proceed abroad and non-departing permanent resident aliens.”67
The rationale of Francis untethered the application of 212(c) from the
statutory text by effectively eliminating the explicit requirement that the alien
must be returning from abroad to apply for the waiver. Despite this step,
however, the Board did not institute a regime whereby all deportable aliens
could seek 212(c) relief. Rather, it permitted the pursuit of 212(c) relief only
where “a ground of deportation is also a ground of inadmissibility.”68 The
subsequent jurisprudence of the Board in 212(c) cases focused overwhelmingly on how to determine the comparability of grounds of deportation and
inadmissibility. In Matter of Salmon, decided shortly after Francis, the Board
held that an alien charged with deportability on the basis of a conviction for a
crime involving moral turpitude could pursue a 212(c) waiver, as this ground
of deportability was comparable to the inadmissibility ground for being
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the lack of total identity
in language between the statutory provisions did not undercut this conclusion
of comparability.69 In Matter of Wadud, however, where the alien was
charged with deportability under a provision pertaining to aiding and abetting
the procurement of a fraudulent immigrant visa, the Board held that there was
no comparable inadmissibility ground, even though the offense for which the
alien was convicted constituted a crime involving moral turpitude.70
After fifteen years of attempting to match deportability provisions with
inadmissibility grounds, the Board issued a decision holding that 212(c)
should be available to all deportable aliens, except for those aliens deportable
on grounds related to the specific grounds of inadmissibility for which 212(c)
is not available, i.e., those exclusion grounds that 212(c) cannot be invoked
to waive.71 The Board justified this approach largely on the basis that the
application and practice in 212(c) cases had already far outstripped the text of
the statute, and that permitting 212(c) for all deportable aliens was at least as

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 29-30 (B.I.A. 1976).
Matter of Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (B.I.A. 1979).
Matter of Salmon, 16 I. & N. Dec. 734 (B.I.A. 1978).
Matter of Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182 (B.I.A. 1984).
Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 265 (B.I.A. 1990; A.G. 1991).
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logical as its past practice of limiting 212(c) relief to comparable grounds of
deportation.72 On review by the Attorney General, however, this approach
was disapproved. In light of the government’s failure to seek further review
in Francis, the Attorney General did not revisit the Board’s decision in
Matter of Silva and its acquiescence in the equal protection holding of the
Second Circuit.73 He did disapprove of a blanket extension of 212(c) into the
deportation context, as the equal protection holding of Francis required only
that 212(c) be made available in deportation proceedings on the same terms
as it would be available in exclusion proceedings.74 The comparable grounds
analysis met this obligation, and, in light of the great distance interpretation
had already come, there was no compelling reason to extend the scope of
212(c) even further past its plain language.75
On the eve of its demise, the Board could thus succinctly state the rule
regarding the availability of 212(c) in deportation proceedings: “The essential analysis is to determine whether the deportation ground under which the
alien has been adjudged deportable has a statutory counterpart among the
exclusion grounds waivable by section 212(c).”76
D. Repeal, St. Cyr, and the Enduring Spectre of 212(c) Relief
In 1996, section 212(c) was repealed as part of the far-reaching reforms
instituted by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act. In its place, Congress provided for a new form of relief entitled
“cancellation of removal for certain lawful permanent residents.”77 In order
to establish eligibility for this form of relief, lawful permanent residents had
to demonstrate admission as a resident for not less than five years, continuous
residence in the United States after having been admitted in any status of not
less than seven years, and the absence of any disqualifying aggravated felony
convictions.78
212(c) did not, however, go quietly into that good night, living on thanks to
the closely divided decision of the Supreme Court in INS v. St. Cyr.79 In St.
Cyr, the Supreme Court determined that IIRIRA was ambiguous regarding
whether Congress intended the repeal of 212(c) to apply to all removal
proceedings instituted after the 1997 effective date of the act.80 To interpret
the statute as categorically foreclosing 212(c) relief to all aliens placed into
removal proceedings after IIRIRA’s effective date would, in the Court’s

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 265-69.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 286-88.
See id.
Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 567, 574 (B.I.A. 1996) (en banc).
See IIRIRA § 304(b).
See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006).
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
Id. at 315.
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opinion, create an impermissibly retroactive effect on those aliens who pled
guilty prior to 1996 in possible reliance on the continued availability of a
waiver.81 In order to avoid this effect, the Court held that “212(c) relief
remains available for aliens . . . whose convictions were obtained through
plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have
been eligible for 212(c) relief at the time of their pleas under the law then in
effect.”82
In response to St. Cyr, the Department of Justice promulgated regulations
in 2004 to address the continuing availability of 212(c) relief to that class of
alien covered by the Supreme Court’s decision.83 These regulations addressed several eligibility issues, including disqualifying certain aliens with
aggravated felony convictions from eligibility for 212(c) relief.84 It also
institutionalized, by regulation, the general Board practice of requiring a
comparable inadmissibility ground for the exercise of 212(c) discretion in
deportation proceedings. Subsection (f)(5) of the regulation provided that
212(c) relief should be denied where “[t]he alien is deportable under former
section 241 of the Act or removable under section 237 of the Act on a ground
which does not have a statutory counterpart in section 212 of the Act.”85
Post-St. Cyr and following the promulgation of the new regulations,
litigation focused largely on when a non-disqualifying aggravated felony
conviction would have a statutory counterpart in the inadmissibility statute
which, by its explicit terms, contained no specific category mandating the
exclusion of aggravated felons. In two cases decided in quick succession in
2005, the Board gave a broad outline to the relevant inquiry: “whether a
ground of deportation or removal has a statutory counterpart in the provisions
for exclusion or inadmissibility turns on whether Congress has employed
similar language to describe substantially equivalent categories of offenses.”86 In Matter of Blake, the Board rejected the alien’s assertion that
there was sufficient overlap between the charge of deportability, aggravated
felony sexual abuse of a minor, and a ground of inadmissibility, as the
charged ground of deportation was not substantially equivalent to the
inadmissibility ground of “crime involving moral turpitude.”87 Likewise, in
Matter of Brieva, the Board found only incidental and insufficient overlap
between the charged ground of deportability, aggravated felony crime of
violence, and the “crime involving moral turpitude” ground of inadmissibility.88 These cases indicated that aliens charged with deportability as aggra-

81. Id.
82. Id. at 326.
83. See Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens With Certain Criminal Convictions Before April 1, 1997,
69 Fed. Reg. 57, 826 (Sept. 28, 2004).
84. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(4).
85. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5).
86. Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 728 (B.I.A. 2005).
87. Id. at 728-29.
88. Matter of Brieva, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766, 771-73 (B.I.A. 2005).
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vated felons would have a difficult road to travel in order to establish
eligibility for 212(c) relief.
III.

CONFLICT IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

Following the Supreme Court’s holding in St. Cyr, 212(c) litigation in the
courts of appeals tended to focus on whether the agency had correctly
determined that a ground of deportability lacked a comparable ground of
inadmissibility, although enterprising aliens still occasionally challenged the
Board’s very use of the comparable grounds analysis in determining a
deportable alien’s eligibility for relief.89 The courts may have occasionally
disagreed with the Board’s finding that a ground of deportation lacked a
comparable ground of inadmissibility, but they uniformly upheld the agency’s use of the comparable grounds analysis.90
This unanimity changed in 2007, when the alien ordered removed in
Matter of Blake petitioned for review of the removal order in the Second
Circuit. That court, relying on its prior precedent decision in Francis, focused
the inquiry not on whether there were comparable grounds between the
charge of deportation and the inadmissibility statute, but on how the specific
criminal offense would be classified under the inadmissibility statute regardless of the lodged charge of deportation.91 Rejecting the comparable grounds
analysis, the rule in the Second Circuit became: “If the offense that renders a
lawful permanent resident deportable would render a similarly situated
lawful permanent resident excludable, the deportable lawful permanent
resident is eligible for a waiver of deportation” under section 212(c).92
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit indicated its own disagreement with the
212(c) status quo, albeit taking a much different road than the Second Circuit.
In Abebe v. Mukasey, that Court held that the deportable alien was not
eligible for a waiver under former section 212(c), but reached that conclusion
only after overruling its prior case law which had followed the equal
protection rationale of Francis.93 The Ninth Circuit determined that Congress could have rationally differentiated between excludable and deportable
aliens in constructing the relief scheme under former section 212(c), and thus
deportable aliens had no cognizable constitutional claim that would mandate
their eligibility for such relief.94 In essence, the Abebe decision was based on
the Court’s conclusion that the statute does not, and should not be read to,
89. See, e.g., De la Rosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 579 F.3d 1327, 1335-40 (11th Cir. 2009).
90. See, e.g., Gjonaj v. INS, 47 F.3d 824, 827 n.4 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing, inter alia, RodriguezPadron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1459-61 (11th Cir. 1994); Rodriguez v. INS, 9 F.3d 408, 412-13 (5th Cir.
1993); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 948-51 (7th Cir. 1993); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309,
311-14 (1st Cir. 1992); Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1988)).
91. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
92. Id. at 103-04.
93. Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), overruling Tapia-Acuna v.
INS, 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 1205-07.
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extend to deportable aliens.
Despite the development of this circuit split, in the years following St. Cyr
the government was able to successfully keep 212(c) cases out of the
Supreme Court. This success was premised on two arguments consistently
made in opposing aliens’ petitions for certiorari: 1) because 212(c) had
already been repealed, there was only a dwindling class of eligible aliens and
thus no compelling or exceptional circumstances that would justify the
Supreme Court’s discretionary exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, and 2) the
Second Circuit was, in effect, the single outlier in an otherwise uniform
interpretation of the statute.95 This string of good luck ended when the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Judulang v. Holder.96
IV. JUDULANG V. HOLDER: THE SUPREME COURT REVISITS 212(C)
Joel Judulang, a native and citizen of the Philippines, had entered the
United States in 1974 and lived there continuously, as a lawful permanent
resident, since that time. In 1988, he was a participant in a brawl that resulted
in the death of an individual. As a result of this event, Judulang pled guilty to
voluntary manslaughter, received a 6-year suspended sentence, and was
released on parole. Subsequently, he also pled guilty to a theft offense.
Following his second plea, the Department of Homeland Security instituted
removal proceedings against him based on a charge of removability related to
the 1988 voluntary manslaughter conviction; deportability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence.97
An immigration judge ordered Judulang removed based on the lodged
charge, and the Board affirmed, holding that Judulang was ineligible for
relief under former section 212(c) because the aggravated felony crime of
violence ground of deportability was not comparable to any of the grounds of
inadmissibility. The Ninth Circuit denied a subsequent petition for review,
and Judulang filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. In his
petition for certiorari, Judulang phrased the question presented for review as:
“[w]hether a lawful permanent resident who was convicted by guilty plea of
an offense that renders him deportable and excludable under differently
phrased statutory subsections, but who did not depart and reenter the United
States between his conviction and the commencement of removal proceedings, is categorically foreclosed from seeking discretionary relief from
removal under former Section 212(c) of the INA.”98 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari over the government’s opposition and, after briefing and

95. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 18-20, Abebe v. Holder, No. 09-600 (S. Ct.
Mar. 29, 2010).
96. Judulang v. Holder, 131 S. Ct. 2093 (2011) (mem.) (order granting the petition for certiorari).
97. See INA §§ 101(a)(43)(F), 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(2006).
98. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Judulang v. Holder, No. 10-694 (S. Ct. Nov. 24, 2010).
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argument, unanimously reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
The issue framed for decision by the Court was whether the Board’s
comparable grounds analysis for determining a deportable alien’s eligibility
for 212(c) relief is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.99 In reviewing agency action and decisions under the APA, the
Court “must assess, among other matters, ‘whether the decision was based on
a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment.’”100 Review under the APA “involves examining the
reasons for agency decisions—or, as the case may be, the absence of such
reasons.”101 The Court was emphatic in its judgment of whether the Board’s
decision could meet these reviewing standards: “The BIA has flunked [the
APA] test here. By hinging a deportable alien’s eligibility for discretionary
relief on the chance correspondence between statutory categories—a matter
irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in this country—the BIA has failed to
exercise its discretion in a reasoned manner.”102
The Court declined to resolve a fundamental dispute in the arguments
presented by Judulang and the government regarding “whether the BIA must
make discretionary relief available to deportable and excludable aliens on
identical terms.”103 According to the Court, this dispute was beside the
point—“The BIA may well have legitimate reasons for limiting § 212(c)’s
scope in deportation cases. But still, it must do so in some rational way.”104
This passage signaled the narrowness of the Court’s approach to the issue. It
would delve no further into the 212(c) swamp than necessary in order to
resolve the specific question it conceived as before it, whether the comparable grounds approach was consistent with the dictates of the APA.
Whether that approach was or was not consistent was made to turn, in the
Court’s opinion, on whether the comparable grounds analysis was tied “to
the purposes of the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the
immigration system.”105 This is where the agency’s approach ran upon the
rough shoals of the APA. A comparison of the statutory grounds of deportability and inadmissibility did not, in the Court’s opinion, address the underlying
issue of whether an alien, based on his conduct, should be offered the
opportunity to apply for discretionary relief.106 In highlighting this point, the

99. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483 (“The reviewing court shall—(2) hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accord with law” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A))).
100. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983))).
101. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484 (citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009)).
102. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 485.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Court specifically referenced the background of Judulang’s case. Although
the aggravated felony crime of violence ground of deportation may encompass conduct that does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude for
purposes of determining admissibility, this fact should not be determinative
of an alien’s eligibility to seek discretionary relief when his specific conduct
might constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.107 In this context, the
Court’s concern was that the Board was painting with too broad a brush in
declining to extend eligibility to deportable aliens. Yet conversely, the Court
also expressed concern in the opposite direction, noting that a deportation
ground that is more specific than a ground of inadmissibility is likewise
irrelevant to the question of whether a specific alien should be permitted to
pursue discretionary relief from removal.108 The Board’s narrow focus on
comparability led it to err in both directions, while effectively ignoring the
underlying facts and circumstances of the conduct that subjected the alien to
deportability in the first place. Yet again, the Court’s concern was solely with
the comparability analysis—“we do not say today that the BIA must give all
deportable aliens meeting § 212(c)’s requirements the chance to apply for a
waiver. The point is instead that the BIA cannot make that opportunity turn
on the meaningless matching of statutory grounds.”109
Beyond the arbitrariness that might inhere in the comparability analysis,
the Court also expressed concern over DHS’s role in lodging charges of
deportability and how this factor compounds the appearance of arbitrariness
in the 212(c) calculus. An alien’s conduct might expose him to deportability
on several grounds, but DHS has the prosecutorial discretion to charge him
with a single or multiple grounds, and the grounds actually charged might not
have a comparable ground in the inadmissibility statute even if DHS could
have lodged a charge of deportability that did have a comparable ground.110
Thus, an alien’s eligibility for 212(c) turned not only on whether a comparable ground of deportability existed, but on how he was initially charged by
DHS.
These twin considerations led to the Court’s conclusion that the comparable grounds approach “make[s the alien’s] right to remain here dependent
on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious” as to constitute arbitrary and
capricious action under the APA.111 The agency’s approach “does not rest on
any factors relevant to whether an alien [] should be deported. It instead
distinguishes among aliens—decides who should be eligible for discretionary relief and who should not—solely by comparing the metes and bounds of
diverse statutory categories into which an alien falls. The resulting Venn
diagrams have no connection to the goals of the deportation process or the
107. Id. at 485-86.
108. Id. at 486 (citing Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 727-28 (2005)).
109. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 486.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 487 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
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rational operation of the immigration laws,” and are exactly the type of action
meant to be overseen and corrected by the APA.112
In reaching this ultimate conclusion, the Court also systematically rejected
the arguments put forward by the government in support of the comparable
grounds approach. First, although the government argued that the Board’s
existing approach was more faithful to the text of 212(c), the Court disagreed. Section 212(c) was not phrased in terms of waiving specific grounds
of exclusion, but in permitting a waiver of excludability so long as the alien
did not fall within the grounds of exclusion that categorically barred
consideration for 212(c) relief.113 As 212(c) does not address itself to the
grounds of inadmissibility, it does not make sense to undertake an approach
in the deportation context that focuses on whether a specific ground of
deportability fits within a specific ground of inadmissibility. The Court could
have ceased its analysis on this point, but proceeded to address whether
212(c) provides any authority for its extension into deportation cases:
More fundamentally, the comparable-grounds approach would not
follow from § 212(c) even were the Government right about the
section’s phrasing. That is because § 212(c) simply has nothing to do
with deportation: The provision was not meant to interact with the
statutory grounds for deportation, any more than those grounds were
designed to interact with the provision. Rather, § 212(c) refers solely to
exclusion decisions; its extension to deportation cases arose from the
agency’s extra-textual view that some similar relief should be available
in that context to avoid unreasonable distinctions. Accordingly, the text
of § 212(c), whether or not phrased in terms of “waiving grounds of
exclusion,” cannot support the BIA’s use of the comparable-grounds
rule—or, for that matter, any other method for extending discretionary
relief to deportation cases. We well understand the difficulties of
operating in such a text-free zone; indeed, we appreciate the Government’s yearning for a textual anchor. But § 212(c), no matter how many
times read or parsed, does not provide one.114
And this was so even where Congress had amended 212(c) shortly before its
repeal to expressly bar the extension of 212(c) relief to certain aliens
deportable on aggravated felony grounds.115
The government also argued that the comparable grounds approach was
firmly rooted in the history of agency adjudication of 212(c) cases, but this
factor was deemed irrelevant as a threshold matter—long-standing practice is
not any less arbitrary and capricious simply by dint of its heritage.116 In any

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 487.
Id.
Id. at 488 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 488 n.11.
Id. at 488.
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event, the Court found Board practice to be inconsistent over the course of
212(c)’s long history, and it had certainly not applied the comparable grounds
approach uniformly over that period.117 For this reason, although somewhat
unnecessarily considering its basic holding in the case, the Court also
rejected Judulang’s argument that Board practice post-2005 was impermissibly retroactive, as the inconsistency of agency adjudications in the 212(c)
context could not have given rise to any reasonable reliance interest regarding a specific approach to determining 212(c) eligibility.118
Finally, the Court rejected any assertion that a cost-benefit analysis could
save the comparable grounds approach. The possibility that alternatives
would entail higher costs to the agency and government could not, standing
alone, save an otherwise arbitrary and capricious policy.119 The Court also
found the more general assertion wanting, as it was not clear that an approach
that examined the underlying conduct or offense of the alien, such as the
Second Circuit’s approach in Blake v. Carbone, would entail significantly
higher costs.120 Beside that specific point, the Court further noted that the
Board could try other alternatives as well, which might prove even less costly
than either the Blake or comparable grounds approach. The only strictures on
remand were that the policy adopted must be consistent with the decisions in
Judulang and St. Cyr.
Regardless of how the Board elected to proceed going forward, the
comparable grounds approach was declared dead: “We must reverse an
agency policy when we cannot discern a reason for it. That is the trouble in
this case. The BIA’s comparable-grounds rule is unmoored from the purposes
and concerns of the immigration laws. It allows an irrelevant comparison
between statutory provisions to govern a matter of the utmost importance—
whether lawful resident aliens with longstanding ties to this country may stay
here. And contrary to the Government’s protestations, it is not supported by
text or practice or cost considerations. The BIA’s approach therefore cannot
pass muster under ordinary principles of administrative law.”121
***
What does Judulang hold, and what does it mandate for how the agency
proceeds in determining the circumstances under which a deportable alien
may apply for 212(c) relief? The holding of Judulang is as simple as
presented by the Court—the comparable grounds approach is arbitrary and
capricious and cannot serve as the basis for determining a deportable alien’s
eligibility for 212(c) relief. Any approach going forward must be consistent
with Judulang, and so no assessment can rely on the matching of statutory

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 488-89.
Id. at 489 n.12.
Id. at 490.
Id.
Id.
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grounds. This point is clear in the Court’s decision, and can easily be fit
within a new approach.
Judulang also requires consistency with St. Cyr, which ostensibly means
only that the Board cannot upset the settled expectations of individuals who
would have been eligible for 212(c) relief prior to the repeal of that provision
in 1996. But the import of this point runs into tension with the Court’s
opinion and cannot so easily be applied going forward. First, which deportable aliens were eligible for 212(c) at the time of its repeal, and thus had
settled expectations of receiving relief? Since the Board’s approach to
determining the threshold eligibility question was overturned in Judulang, it
must be left to the agency to address this threshold point of eligibility and
determine which classes of deportable aliens did have a protectable reliance
interest. Second, it is not clear which deportable aliens’ expectations must be
protected. The Court consistently stated that it was not holding all deportable
aliens must be eligible for 212(c) relief, and that the Board might have
perfectly reasonable grounds for limiting the extension of 212(c) in the
deportation context.122 The reference to St. Cyr thus gives the agency only
the broad outlines of a future policy while leaving most of the important
questions unanswered.
Although the Court did not dictate what policy the agency must adopt,
giving it only the guideposts of Judulang and St. Cyr for reference, the
opinion of the Court seemed to incline towards the approach taken in Blake v.
Carbone. Justice Kagan’s opinion frequently notes that it is the underlying
conduct that should be the focus of the inquiry, and whether that conduct
might have subjected an alien to inadmissibility in the appropriate circumstances.123 The opinion even noted that the costs of a Blake-like approach
would likely be no more than the existing costs of undertaking the comparable grounds analysis, and that agency expertise would be well-tuned to the
necessities of shifting to an offense-focused inquiry.124 The conclusion that
the Court does favor this approach is, of course, simply based on dicta and an
extrapolation of importance from the opinion’s frequent favorable references
to this approach. Nonetheless, the agency would do well to focus on those
sections as a sign of what form an approach must take in order to meet the
standards set by the Supreme Court.
Yet beyond its specific holding, the Court’s decision leaves much to be
desired. The Supreme Court was under an obligation to “say what the law
is,”125 not simply what it is not, and this point has even greater force when
there are a dwindling number of 212(c) applications outstanding and where
there is only a finite and shrinking class of aliens who could take advantage
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See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 485, 486.
See id. at 485-86, 490.
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of this form of relief. Judulang presented an opportunity to give concrete
form to 212(c), and the question, at least as presented by the petitioner
himself, was broader than what the Court actually decided. The narrowness
of the holding ensures continuing uncertainty in the context of 212(c)
eligibility, and may well perpetuate litigation on the issue well into the third
decade of 212(c)’s statutory demise.
First, the threshold consideration of the Court does not comport with the
necessary analysis. Justice Kagan focused the question of whether the
comparable grounds approach is arbitrary and capricious on whether that
policy adequately accounted for the purposes of the immigration laws,
including an alien’s fitness to pursue discretionary relief and the desirability
of his continuing residence in the United States.126 Yet the question of
eligibility for discretionary relief is a statutory one that is unmoored, from an
initial interpretive perspective, from amorphous questions regarding the
desirability of a specific alien to obtain discretionary relief. Put another way,
whether the Board’s interpretation of 212(c) is arbitrary or not depends on the
text of the statute, not irrelevant concerns regarding an alien’s conduct or
equities that otherwise do not fit within the question of whether he can
establish statutory eligibility for relief. An alien who cannot demonstrate
statutory eligibility is not eligible for relief simply because he might be in
some abstract sense a good person.
The justification for the Court’s approach most likely lies with its consistent statement that 212(c) does not provide any basis for its extension to
deportation cases, and thus, since the comparable grounds approach by
necessity is not moored to the statute, the question of statutory eligibility is
irrelevant.127 If the government’s approach to extending 212(c) has already
far exceeded the bounds of the statute, then the appropriate question would
be not the statutory eligibility issue, but whether the granting or denial of
relief to certain classes of aliens otherwise comports with the purposes of the
immigration law, specifically, in whether it ensures that desirable aliens are
provided an opportunity to seek relief from removal. Framed in this manner,
the Court’s analysis proceeds necessarily from its first premise that the
government’s policy in 212(c) cases is not tied and cannot be tied to the text
of the statute.
Even assuming that the Court could justify its approach in this case along
the lines noted in the preceding paragraph, there was no reason to limit the
scope of its holding to the narrow question of the comparable grounds
approach. The relevant inquiry should have been whether the statute sanctions the extension of 212(c) relief to deportable aliens and, if so, the Court
could then have addressed the more specific concern over the method the
Board uses to determine which sub-classes of deportable aliens might be
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eligible for relief. Yet, despite ostensibly resting its holding on the incompatibility of the comparable grounds approach with the purposes of the immigration law, the Court did provide a quite emphatic answer to the textual
question—212(c) provides no anchor, “no matter how many times read or
parsed,” to the assertion that deportable aliens should be eligible for relief.128
The Court’s statement on this point is tied back to its narrow holding, but it
provides no rationale for limiting that point—that 212(c) does not provide an
anchor for the extension of relief to deportable aliens—to the comparable
grounds approach itself, i.e., if 212(c) cannot provide any anchor for the
extension of relief to deportable aliens, then any method for this extension,
not just the comparable grounds approach, would seemingly be impermissible under the appropriate interpretation of the statute. This finding of the
Court, although never made explicitly as a formal “holding,” pervades the
entirety of the opinion, yet at the same time contradicts the Court’s action in
remanding the case for a determination of those circumstances where 212(c)
may be extended to deportable aliens.
Second, and ancillary to the first concern, is Judulang’s failure to address
the underlying question of what authority could sanction the extension of
212(c) to deportable aliens. The Court made quite clear that this authority
would not extend from the statute itself, as 212(c) is a provision explicitly
meant only to waive excludability.129 Perhaps in the context of the general
question of authority, Congress’s amendment of the statute before repeal to
include reference to deportation grounds is relevant, but this point is not
easily squared with the Court’s categorical rejection of the statute as a source
of relevant authority.130 The equal protection rationale of Francis stands as a
source of limited authority, as the Court did not specifically address that
issue, but at least two Justices expressed concerns on this point. Justice
Kennedy, at oral argument, expressed doubts over the legitimacy of Francis’s
equal protection analysis,131 while Justice Alito opined that perhaps the best
path forward was that charted by the Ninth Circuit in Abebe.132 The Court’s
decision did not rest on Francis, and did not explicitly overrule or abrogate
Abebe, so the question of equal protection as a source of authority is open.
Yet the more fundamental issue with Francis is the fact that the decision
addressed equal protection concerns over the treatment of different classes of

128. Id. at 488; see also id. at 480 (“by its terms, § 212(c) did not apply when an alien was being
deported.”); id. at 483 n.7 (“The BIA’s comparable-grounds policy . . . is not an interpretation of any
statutory language—nor could it be, given that § 212(c) does not mention deportation cases”); id. at
485 n.9 (“The case would be different if Congress had intended for § 212(c) relief to depend on the
interaction of exclusion grounds and deportation grounds. But the Government has presented us with
no evidence to this effect, nor have we found any.”).
129. Id. at 488.
130. Id. at 488 n.11.
131. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17-18, Judulang v. Holder, No. 10-694 (U.S. Wed. Oct. 12,
2011).
132. Id. at 16.
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deportable aliens; it did not hold that differential treatment of inadmissible
and deportable aliens in the 212(c) context would constitute a violation of
equal protection.133 Whether or not such a violation is cognizable, Francis
provides no support, on its face or by its rationale, for extending 212(c) to
deportation cases.
Perhaps the executive has inherent authority to grant discretionary relief
from removal as part of its general obligations in the context of immigration
law, but there is no solid grounding for this authority in the text of the
Constitution or the case-law of the Supreme Court. Whatever authority the
executive might have under the INA to institute or terminate proceedings,
this prosecutorial discretion is unlikely to encompass an unbounded authority
to grant statutory relief from removal in the absence of statutory eligibility
for that relief. There are, then, outstanding points of authority on which the
Board and other immigration agencies can rest their extension of 212(c) into
deportation proceedings, but the Supreme Court was remiss in failing to
address this important question.
The flaws in the Court’s decision can thus generally be attributed to the
narrowness of its holding. The Court elected to render a decision on one
single issue under the 212(c) heading, the permissibility of the comparable
grounds analysis, without delving into the related issues regarding whether
relief can be extended to deportable aliens and, if so, what the executive’s
authority for that extension would be. In declining to render decisions on
these points, and simply noting Judulang and St. Cyr as guideposts for the
agency, it also necessarily failed to offer any clear-cut guidance to the agency
on the appropriate path forward. Such a decision may have been appropriate
in the context of an existing statute where the intricacies and nuances of
application could be teased out through subsequent litigation. Where the
relevant statutory provision has been repealed for nearly two decades,
however, this approach is singularly misguided.
V.

ELIGIBILITY FOR 212(C) IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS POST-JUDULANG

Whatever flaws there are in the Court’s decision in Judulang, the opinion
clearly mandates a change of policy in how the Board and other immigration
authorities determine the eligibility of deportable aliens for 212(c) relief. The
purpose of this section is to weigh the possible policy directions that the
agencies could take against the holdings and logic of Judulang and St. Cyr.
A. Limit Eligibility for 212(c) Relief to Inadmissible Aliens
The easiest and cleanest path forward, from an interpretive perspective,
would be to limit 212(c) eligibility to aliens charged with inadmissibility, the
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only class of aliens who the statute explicitly covers. Such a determination
would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement in Judulang that
there is no textual basis for the extension of 212(c) relief to aliens charged
with deportability.134 Such a limiting interpretation would also be consistent
with the long-standing distinction between inadmissibility and deportability
made by the INA, and the interpretations of the courts of appeals that have
limited the availability of other section 212 waivers to their specific terms,
i.e., aliens charged with inadmissibility. Categorically excluding deportable
aliens from 212(c) relief would also be the least arbitrary and easiest policy to
apply, as it would eliminate all the complexities that have grown up beside
the comparable grounds analysis, remove the risks of arbitrary denials based
on DHS’s decision to lodge one ground of deportation rather than another,
and treat all deportable aliens exactly the same way. Finally, because this
interpretation would be based on the Supreme Court’s own statement
regarding the correct interpretation of section 212(c), there are no cognizable
arguments that adopting this policy would run afoul of the retroactivity
limitations inherent in St. Cyr. As a definitive judicial construction of the
statute, the Court’s holding could presumptively be applied to all pending
cases.135 Thus, from a practical and administrative stand point, this approach
has much to recommend it as a path forward.
Yet such a determination by the agency to eliminate 212(c) relief for all
deportable aliens would go far beyond the Court’s narrow holding in
Judulang. The Court did not explicitly hold 212(c) is unavailable to such
aliens, despite its statement that there is no textual anchor for such an
extension of relief. In fact, the Court’s decision assumes that it will remain
available to at least some deportable aliens, leaving it to the Board to find a
rational way of distinguishing among those who should be eligible and those
who should not.136 A dramatic change in policy would also be in tension with
St. Cyr, who was himself a deportable alien, and would likely operate,
practically if not legally, in an impermissibly retroactive fashion as applied to
certain classes of deportable alien. The narrowness of the Court’s holding is
likely relevant in this context, as it should be taken as a sanction for the
extension of 212(c) to deportable aliens and a passing-of-the-buck to the
Board to figure out the best way to justify the extension. If the Court had
really wanted to disqualify all deportable aliens from 212(c) relief, it could

134. See Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 488.
135. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 278 n.32 (1994) (“While it was accurate
in 1974 to say that a new rule announced in a judicial decision was only presumptively applicable to
pending cases, we have since established a firm rule of retroactivity.”); Harper v. Virginia Dept. of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97-98 (1993) (“When this Court does not reserve the question whether its
holding should be applied to the parties before it, [] an opinion announcing a rule of federal law is
properly understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application and must be read to
hold . . . that its rule should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the Court.”) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
136. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 484, 485, 490.
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have done so and eliminated the more nuanced basis of its decision. Having
left that question unanswered, at least as a function of its explicit holding in
Judulang, limiting eligibility for 212(c) relief to inadmissible aliens would be
an unwise policy choice by the relevant agencies. It would also be the easiest
way to ensure continued litigation in this area, including another trip to the
Supreme Court, an outcome surely to be disfavored in light of that Court’s
implicit assumption that 212(c) should remain available in deportation
proceedings.
B. 212(c) Should be Available in Deportation Proceedings Only Nunc Pro
Tunc or Where Admissibility is at Issue
Rather than eliminate 212(c) eligibility for deportable aliens, the agency
could adopt a limited extension into the deportation context in circumstances
where the waiver would be granted nunc pro tunc or where the alien’s
admissibility is the central focus of the proceeding. On the first point, the
policy adopted in Matter of L and Matter of G-A- could be adhered to,
permitting an application for 212(c) relief nunc pro tunc where an alien’s
conviction pre-dates his last entry into the United States. In those circumstances, where an alien would have been inadmissible if stopped at the border
but was, inexplicably, permitted to enter and only then placed into deportation proceedings, allowing the pursuit of a 212(c) waiver would reflect
nothing more than what Attorney General Jackson had termed a “correction
of a record of entry.”137 Extending 212(c) to this circumstance is faithful to
both the text and the spirit of the statute, and rationally limits eligibility to a
discrete class of deportable aliens who are eligible exactly because they
should have been charged with being inadmissible. Eligibility thus turns on
the inadmissibility statute itself, and not on any chance correspondence
between the charged ground of deportation and the grounds of inadmissibility.
Aliens could also be permitted to seek a waiver in deportation proceedings
where their admissibility is at issue. For instance, aliens in deportation
proceedings applying for adjustment of status should be permitted to seek
212(c) relief, as they are, in pursuing adjustment, subject to all the grounds of
inadmissibility at section 212(a) of the INA.138 Additionally, aliens charged
with being subject to deportation on the grounds that they were inadmissible
when they entered could be permitted to pursue relief under section 212(c).
This would effectively operate much like the allowance for nunc pro tunc
relief and, once the inadmissibility of the alien is waived, the charge of
deportability would be eliminated. The issue of travel would still have to be
resolved, as 212(c), by its terms, applies only when an alien has traveled
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abroad and is seeking admission,139 but this could be done by requiring the
filing of the 212(c) application prior to travel abroad, as contemplated by the
regulations.140
The question of travel also leads back to the long-abandoned practice of
“pre-examination.” Another way forward would be to permit aliens who are
deportable and inadmissible based on the same conduct to apply for 212(c)
prior to any departure from the United States. If the application is approved,
the alien can depart the United States and then again seek admission with a
pre-approved waiver of any ground of inadmissibility. By this operation, the
alien could be readmitted pursuant to 212(c), while mostly adhering to the
text and spirit of that provision. Although this practice was not carried
forward into the 1952 Act because of Congressional opposition to its
application, there is no reason that the agency could not, at this point,
resuscitate it as a method for dealing with the remaining 212(c) cases.
In any event, these circumstances illustrate at least one path forward:
permitting 212(c) relief in deportation proceedings where, by the nature of
the charge or the conduct of the alien, or because of the application pursued,
admissibility is the central issue. Because admissibility would be the focus,
this approach would also eliminate concerns about trying to root the executive’s authority to extend 212(c) into the deportation context. If 212(c) is best
read, in the Court’s opinion, as operating as a waiver of inadmissibility, then
it is immaterial that the relevant “denial” of admission would occur in the
context of a deportation proceeding where the alien’s admissibility would
otherwise be the main issue.141 This shift in focus is also consistent with any
retroactivity concerns, as the Court noted that deportable aliens did not have
any settled expectation of a particular form of inquiry into their eligibility for
212(c) relief prior to the blanket institution of the comparable grounds
approach.142
C. Base 212(c) Eligibility on Whether the Alien’s Conduct Would Have
Rendered Him Inadmissible
The agency could also take the hint from the Supreme Court and make
212(c) relief available in deportation proceedings where the offense or
conviction that serves as the basis of the charge of deportability would also
have exposed the alien to inadmissibility, i.e., the focus would be on the
conduct of the alien, and whether that conduct would fit within a ground of
inadmissibility, rather than on whether the charge of deportability itself is
comparable to a ground of inadmissibility. As noted in Section IV, although
the Supreme Court did not mandate adoption of this type of approach, it more
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than once noted the logic behind it and at least implicitly endorsed it as a rule
for going forward.143 This type of policy would make a broad swath of
deportable aliens eligible for 212(c) relief. The only circumstances where
relief would not be available would be: 1) where the alien’s conduct or
conviction would not have rendered him deportable at the time of commission or conviction, and 2) where the charged conduct or conviction falls
within one of the grounds of inadmissibility that are expressly barred from
consideration for 212(c) relief. By focusing on the underlying conduct of the
alien, rather than the ground of removal, this approach would eliminate any
arbitrary distinctions in the eligibility for 212(c) relief between the classes of
deportable and inadmissible aliens.
The biggest problem with this approach ties back to the question of what
authority the executive has for extending 212(c) relief to any deportable
aliens. There is no warrant in the text of 212(c) for extending relief to aliens
charged with deportability, save, perhaps, the reading offered in the foregoing section where the admissibility of the deportable alien is the central issue.
The equal protection rationale of Francis, although not disturbed by the
Supreme Court, is a tenuous reed on which to base such authority. In that
case, the Second Circuit did recognize the Board’s limiting interpretation of
the statute as mandated by its text, and Congress otherwise does have broad
authority to regulate immigration and create distinctions between different
classes of aliens. There is no currently accepted free-standing executive
power to grant relief to aliens outside the bounds set by Congress, and as the
statute cannot be read to extend to deportable aliens the executive cannot
extend it absent the type of constitutional concerns advanced in Francis. All
this is simply to say that in order to pursue this approach, the executive would
have to offer some sort of rationale or basis of authority for extending 212(c)
to deportable aliens.
What if no authority was found for this extension? Rather than extend
212(c) relief to deportable aliens, the executive could conceivably adopt a
policy whereby it would exercise its prosecutorial discretion in deportation
cases consistent with the terms of 212(c). For instance, the government could
either decline to pursue proceedings against a deportable alien who would be
eligible for 212(c) under a conduct-based approach, or terminate proceedings
once that “eligibility” was established. The executive has the broad authority
to exercise its discretion in this fashion, and this type of program could skirt
the more troublesome issue of the text of the statute and the source of
executive authority to extend 212(c) past the language of the statute. At the
same time, there are drawbacks, as the “relief” from removal would reside
solely in the discretion of the government to forego formal proceedings.
Rather than obtaining a formal grant of relief, as 212(c) or cancellation of
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removal would be, an alien in this circumstance would simply receive
indefinitely deferred action.
D. Congressional Action
The preceding three subsections have focused on potential avenues the
executive agencies could take in gauging the eligibility of deportable aliens
for relief under 212(c). A final possibility for resolution of this issue bears
mentioning: Congress could step in and take action that would effectively
moot the need for further agency interpretation. Congress could eliminate
212(c) relief for all aliens, eliminate it for just deportable aliens, or it could
explicitly extend 212(c) relief to deportable aliens on set statutory terms.
First, the continued availability of 212(c) relief for aliens in general is due
solely to Congress’s failure to specify the temporal range of the 1996
repeal.144 Congress could have, in 1996, mandated the repeal of 212(c) for all
proceedings instituted after IIRIRA’s effective date, but its ambiguity on
whether this is what it intended led the Supreme Court to conclude that
212(c) should remain available for aliens with pre-IIRIRA guilty pleas. At
this stage, Congress could, as part of ongoing attempts at immigration
reform, permissibly eliminate the availability of 212(c) relief in all removal
proceedings instituted after a date certain.145 Such a step would be no less
permissible in light of St. Cyr, as that decision was based on ambiguity in
IIRIRA and Congress’s intent, not on a holding that Congress could not have
eliminated 212(c) relief altogether. Eliminating 212(c) relief in this manner
would, of course, upset the expectations of both inadmissible and deportable
aliens in this post-St. Cyr world, but there is nothing in St. Cyr itself that
would call into question the permissibility of this repeal. This clean break
would settle all outstanding 212(c) issues, with any future litigation centered
on the retroactivity question.
Second, rather than eliminate 212(c) for all aliens, Congress could simply
specify that those charged with deportability may not pursue relief. This
would be no less permissible than a blanket repeal of 212(c), and would have
the added bonus of returning the meaning of 212(c) to the explicit terms of its
text. Congress could, additionally, institute some new form of relief for
deportable aliens that would be comparable to 212(c),146 such as a new
waiver of deportability under section 237 of the INA, but an enactment
disallowing 212(c) relief for deportable aliens would be no less permissible
without some new form of relief to accompany it.

144. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315-20.
145. See id. at 316 (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268).
146. Cancellation of removal is not comparable to 212(c), as any aggravated felony conviction is
a disqualification under that form of relief, whereas certain aliens with aggravated felony convictions
may still be eligible for 212(c) relief.
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Finally, Congress could extend 212(c) relief to deportable aliens by
statutory enactment, along the same lines that it is currently available to
inadmissible aliens, i.e., with all deportable aliens eligible except for those
whose ground of deportability is akin to the grounds of inadmissibility that
bar 212(c) eligibility. This proposal would eliminate any need to develop an
agency policy for determining which deportable aliens are eligible, would
grant the agency clear authority for the extension of 212(c) to deportable
aliens, and would undercut any assertions that allegedly similarly situated
classes of aliens are being treated differently.
Congressional action such as that outlined above would constitute the
most definitive resolution of the outstanding 212(c) issues, but it is by far the
least likely. Congress has shown little inclination to return to the pressing
issues of immigration reform, and the opportunity to clarify the seventeen
year old repeal of 212(c) is unlikely to entice action. For better or worse, the
ongoing saga of 212(c) will be an administrative, not legislative, issue.
***
This section is best closed by hazarding an opinion regarding the best path
forward. Consistent with Judulang’s own seeming reliance on the viability of
an offense-based approach, this would seem like the best policy for adjudicators to establish. Under this approach, 212(c) should be made available to
deportable aliens where the underlying conduct or offense that has exposed
them to deportability would have fallen within a ground of inadmissibility.
This focus on whether conduct would fit within a ground of inadmissibility is
distinct from the prior focus on whether the grounds of deportability and
inadmissibility are sufficiently comparable to permit relief, and eliminates all
relevant distinctions between the classes of inadmissible and deportable
aliens. The commission of the same offense and the same conduct will result
in 212(c) eligibility regardless of whether an alien is charged with deportability or inadmissibility.
There would still be nuances to tease out were the agency to adopt this
policy. There may be temporal limitations to eligibility, for instance, that are
dictated by St. Cyr’s focus on reliance. For example, if an alien pled guilty to
an offense prior to the repeal of 212(c), but that conviction did not render him
deportable at the time it was entered, he cannot be said to have any reliance
interest on the continued available of 212(c) relief. If his conduct subsequently subjects him to the grounds of deportation because of changes in the
law, he should not be permitted to pursue 212(c) relief. In short, an alien must
have not only pled to the relevant offense prior to the repeal of 212(c), but
that offense must have subjected him to deportability at that time, and be able
to fit within a ground of inadmissibility.
The issue of “travel” is also relevant. As written, 212(c) applies where a
lawful permanent resident is returning to the United States after a brief trip
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abroad, not under an order of deportation.147 Should deportable aliens have
to travel in order to obtain relief under section 212(c)? The regulations
provide that the application may be filed prior to an alien’s departure from the
United States, so the agency could, in extending 212(c) to deportable aliens,
require them to travel after the filing and thereby seek admission upon their
return.148 This would remain faithful to the language of 212(c), even at the
risk of being a formal application of the text. Or the agency could dispense
with travel altogether on the basis of the Francis equal protection rationale,
that travel is not a rational distinction between these classes of aliens, and
thus should not be deemed a necessary aspect of eligibility for relief. In that
circumstance, the question of eligibility would rest only with whether a
pre-1996 plea subjected an alien to a ground of deportability and encompassed conduct that could also have been fit within a ground of inadmissibility.
Finally, the reference to Francis inevitably brings one back to the threshold question of authority—what authority does the agency have for extending
212(c) to this class of aliens? Francis provides a potential basis, even if its
equal protection rationale is weak and not of immediate relevance to whether
permissible distinctions can be made between inadmissible and deportable
aliens. Another approach would be to simply ignore the question of authority
altogether in providing relief to both inadmissible and deportable aliens on
identical grounds. However distasteful this might be to legal purists, there is
some force to the argument that the Supreme Court encouraged just this in
Judulang. Although explicitly noting that 212(c) itself provides no source of
authority for granting relief to deportable aliens, the Court did not strain to
come up with the appropriate source, yet at the same time did not abrogate
Francis and clearly contemplated the eligibility of at least some deportable
aliens for 212(c) relief. One way to read this silence is by assuming that the
question of authority just is not relevant at this late date. This form of relief
has been repealed for seventeen years, the jurisprudence has become a mess,
and there are only a finite and shrinking number of aliens for whom 212(c) is
even a possibility. In this circumstance, Judulang is perhaps best taken as a
directive to clean up this mess in the easiest and most equitable manner
possible, while creating no future 212(c) jurisprudential waves in going
about this task. The policy outlined above would do just that, leaving the
needling question of administrative authority to academic commentators.
CONCLUSION
It is uncontroversial to say that the administration of the immigration laws
should comport with basic standards of due process and fundamental
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fairness, and that their application should not lead to arbitrary decisions
regarding an alien’s ability to remain in the United States. This principle well
illustrates the development of the agency’s 212(c) policy that gave rise to
the Supreme Court’s “arbitrary and capricious” holding in Judulang. In the
infancy of that development, under both the Seventh Proviso and 212(c),
relief from removal was extended by the executive to encompass deportable
classes of aliens not covered by the explicit language of 212(c). As that
development accelerated, first under Francis and then under the Board’s
comparable grounds analysis, more deportable aliens became eligible for
relief. As 212(c) stood at the time of Judulang, a very large class of
deportable aliens was eligible for relief not because of any statute Congress
had enacted, but solely because the Board had determined that the extension of relief to deportable aliens would be a fairer and more just way to
administer the immigration laws. That the final policy can be described as
arbitrary in the distinctions it created between different sets of deportable aliens should not obscure this underlying fact—the decision in Judulang is the end result of the agency’s decision to liberalize relief under
212(c).
This deconstruction of Judulang thus serves an important role in undercutting the simplistic and largely erroneous narratives of immigration adjudication offered by the New York Times, litigators, and academics. It does not
establish the sanctity of agency adjudication or assert that however the
agency decides a case that decision is fair or equitable, but it does point to
nuances under the surface of our immigration system that must be paid
attention to if a fair and honest assessment of that system is to be made.
Meaningful reform can only be accomplished if both the benefits and
drawbacks of our current system are understood, and they cannot be
understood when hidden beneath self-serving assertions made simply to
bolster existing prejudices about how the system operates. Inviting one to
read the true story of 212(c) embodied in Judulang entails seeing and
understand how agency adjudication can drift from narrower limitations and,
despite attempting to bring more individuals within the purview of discretionary relief, end in an arbitrary policy that, while granting eligibility to a broad
swath of aliens, does not create meaningful distinctions between those who
are and are not eligible.
Beyond the role of Judulang in fixing the biased narrative of immigration
adjudication, there is an obvious practical dimension to the case; after all, the
Supreme Court was concerned about the technical issue of how to extend a
certain form of relief to a class of aliens. Although a number of policy options
are open to the executive agencies in moving forward post-Judulang, the
most appropriate policy would be to focus on the underlying offense of the
deportable alien and whether that offense would fit within a ground of
inadmissibility. This approach, as more fully developed in this article, meets
the Supreme Court’s concerns over the arbitrary application of the compa-
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rable grounds analysis and, in light of the opinion’s frequent favorable
references to this sort of approach, would likely meet with approval by the
Court if challenged. Guessing at the odds of future certiorari review is almost
always a fool’s game, and Judulang itself seemed like an unexpected
exercise ten years after St. Cyr, but the easiest and most equitable way to lead
212(c) to its final resting place is by heeding the implicit thrust of the Court’s
decision.

